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T HE financing of public elementary and secondary education in the fifty
states is presently interwoven among judicial theories, various and
often poorly designed concepts of educational adequacy, special interest
groups, and what some might call legal and political theater. Since Rose v.
CouncilforBetterEducation, Inc., a multiplicity of state courts have examined
a variety of claims involving equity and adequacy and the applicable state
constitutional controlling language with a variety of theories, conflicting
examinations, and differing results.' Nearly all state legislatures have
I Professor, Educational Administration and Policy, University of Florida. Much of this
piece is adapted from the following of the author's previous works: R. Craig Wood & George
Lange, The Justiciability Doctrine and Selected State Education Finance Constitutional Challenges, J.
OF EDUC. FIN., Summer 2oo6, at I, 1-18 [hereinafter Wood & Lange, The Justiciability Doctrine];
R. Craig Wood & George Lange, Selected State Education Finance Constitutional Litigation in
the Context of Judicial Review, WEST'S EDUC. L. REP., 2OO6, at I, 2-14 [hereinafter Wood &
Lange, Constitutional Litigation in the Context of Judicial Review]; William E. Thro & R. Craig
Wood, The Constitutional Text Matters: Reflections on Recent School Finance Cases (Oct.
2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Ky. L.J.) (paper presented at Education Law
Association Annual Meeting in Louisville, Kentucky); R. Craig Wood & Bruce D. Baker, An
Examination and Analysis of the Equity and Adequacy Concepts of Constitutional Challenges to State
Education Finance Distribution Formulas, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 125, 142-143 (2004);
R. C. WOOD & Assocs., STATE OF RHODE ISLAND EDUCATION ADEQUACY STUDY: FINAL REPORT
1-5 (2007), http:/lrcwoodassoc.com/pdf/rhodeisland.pdf (presented to the Joint Committee to
Establish a Permanent Education Foundation Aid Formula for Rhode Island).
2 For a general discussion of this area, see R. CRAIG WOOD, EDUCATIONAL FINANCE LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE AID PLANS-AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES (3d ed. 2007);
Thro & Wood, supra note I, at 3 n.8, noting the following cases: Alabama: Opinion of the
Justices, 624 So. zd 107 (Ala. 1993); Alaska: Matanuska-Susima Borough Sch. Dist. v. State,
931 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1997); Arizona: Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d
806 (Ariz. 1994); Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Arkansas: Lake View Sch. Dist.
No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 3o , 651 S.W.2d
90 (Ark. 1983); California: Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Serrano v. Priest, 487
P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Colorado: Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982);
Connecticut: Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Florida: Schroeder v. Palm Beach
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experienced a constitutional challenge regarding the equity and/or
County Sch. Bd., 10 So. 3d 1134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Coal. for Adequacy and Fairness in
Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 68o So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996); Georgia: McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.zd
156 (Ga. 1981); Idaho: Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho
1993); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.zd 635 (Idaho 1975); Illinois: Comm. for Educ. Rights v.
Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (111. 1996); Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46 (111. 1973); Indiana: Bonner
ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516 (Ind. 2oo9); Kansas: Montoy v. State, 102 P.3d 1 I6O
(Kan. 2005), supplemented, 112 P3d 923 (Kan. 2oo5), republished with concuryrng opinion, 120 P3d
306 (Kan. 2005); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. '994); Kentucky:
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Louisiana: La. Ass'n of
Educators v. Edwards, 521 So. 2d 390 (La. 1988); Maine: Sch. Admin. Dist. No. I v. Comm'r.,
659 A.2d 854 (Me. 1995); Maryland: Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d
758 (Md. 1983); Massachusetts: Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.zd 1134 (Mass. 2005);
McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.zd i6 (Mass. 1993); Michigan:
Milliken v. Green, 212 N.Wz2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Minnesota: Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.zd 299
(Minn. 1993); Missouri: Comm. for Educ. Equality v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477 (Mo. 2009); Comm.
for Educ. Equality v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1994); Montana: Columbia Falls Elementary
Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 2005 MT 69, 326 Mont. 304, 109 P.3d 257; Helena Elementary Sch.
Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.zd 684 (Mont. 1989); State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 520 P.zd 776
(Mont. 1974); Nebraska: Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity and Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W2d
164 (Neb. 2007); Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.zd 349 (Neb. 1993); New Hampshire: Londonderry
Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State, 958 A.2d 930 (N.H. 2oo8); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor,
703 A.zd 1353 (N.H. 1997); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.zd 1375 (N.H. 1993); New
Jersey: Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989 (N.J. 2oo9); Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997);
Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 199o); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); New
York: Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 8oi N.E.zd 326 (N.Y. 2003); Reform Educ. Fin.
Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 6o6 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist,
439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); North Carolina: Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.zd
365 (N.C. 2004); Leandro v. State, 468 S.E.2d 543 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 488 S.E.2d 249
(N.C. 1997); Britt v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 361
S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987); North Dakota: Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. i v. State, 511 N.W.zd 247
(N.D. 1994); Ohio: State ex tel. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.zd 195 (Ohio 2003); DeRolph v. State,
780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.zd 733 (Ohio 1997); Bd. of Educ.
of the City Sch. Dist. of Cincinnati v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); Oklahoma: Okla.
Educ. Ass'n v. State, i58 P.3 d 1o58 (Okla. 2007); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State,
746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Oregon: Withers v. State, 891 P.2d 675 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Coal.
for Equitable Sch. Funding v. State, 8i 1 P.2d i16 (Or. 1991); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or.
1976); Pennsylvania: Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.zd 1 io (Pa. 1999); Danson v. Casey,
399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Rhode Island: City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995);
South Carolina: Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.zd 535 (S.C. 1999); Richland
County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); South Dakota: Olson v. Guindon, 771 N.W.zd
318 (S.D. 2009); Tennessee: Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 91 S.W.3d 232 (Tenn. 2002);
Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 894 S.W.2d 734 (Tenn. 1995); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v.
McWherer, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Texas: Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep.
Sch. Dist., 176 S.W3d 746 (Tex. 2005); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.Wzd
491 (Tex. 1991); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Vermont:
Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997); Virginia: Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138
(Va. 1994); Washington: Seattle Sch. Dist. No. i v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Northshore
Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash. 1974); Sch. Dists.' Alliance for Adequate
Funding of Special Educ. v. State, 202 P.3d 99o (Wash. Ct. App. 2oo9), reh'ggranted, 217 P3d
337 (Wash. 2009); West Virginia: Bd. of Educ. of the County of Kanawha v. W. Va. Bd. of Educ.,
639 S.E.2d 893 (W. Va. 2006); State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. of Randolph v. Bailey, 453 S.E.2d 368
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adequacy of the state education finance distribution formula.3
It is the purpose of this paper to examine selected education finance
constitutional challenges post-Rose with the observation that in certain
instances such claims are without judicial merit and present claims that
are essentially histrionic in nature. In addition, they are fundamentally
lacking a sound substantive education finance research foundation upon
which state constitutional claims can be based.
I. JUSTICIABILITY AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
4
State constitutions are inherently dissimilar from the United States
Constitution. In order to grasp the complexity of the fifty state constitutions
it is necessary to consider judicial theory, constitutional interpretation, and
the unique nature of state courts and constitutions. Such considerations
must distinguish state judiciaries and these courts' institutional and
administrative roles from that of the federal courts;5 while the concept of
(W. Va. 1994); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Wisconsin: Vincent v. Voight, 614
N.W.zd 388 (Wis. zooo); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.zd 568 (Wis. 1989); Wyoming: Campbell
County Sch. Dist. v. State, i18 P.3d 43 (Wyo. 2008); State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 32
P.3d 325 (Wyo. 2001); State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 19 P3d 518 (Wyo. 2001); Campbell
County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v.
Herschler, 6o6 P zd 310 (Wyo. I98o); Sweetwater County Planning Comm. for the Org. of Sch.
Dists. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971).
3 Thro & Wood, supra note 1, at 2-3 (citing Bonner, 885 N.E.zd at 692 n.5). Only
Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, and Utah have avoided litigation. Id. at 3 n.7.
4 Much of what appears in the first half of this piece is adapted or directly quoted from
the following sources: Wood & Lange, The Justiciability Doctrine, supra note i, at 1-18; Wood &
Lange, Constitional Litigation in the Context ofJudicial Review, supra note i, at 2-14. Quotation
marks and indications of modifications have been left out for purposes of clarity and read-
ability.
5 Federal courts are referred to herein as Article III courts given that the federal judi-
ciary was specifically addressed in Article III of the United States Constitution, which reads
as follows:
Section. i. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Section. 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to
all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-
to all Cases of admirality and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies
to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-
between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
200()--2010 ]
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judicial function and role has often been considered in general terms, the
doctrines which apply to the United States Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts are not completely apposite to state court adjudication.
Constitutions specify the delegation of governmental powers, while
identifying rights that the government cannot breach. 6 The authority
granted to the courts to consider whether the actions of the government are
consistent with these tenets and to invalidate those which fail to evidence
fidelity with the same is commonly known as judicial review.7 The authority
to determine the meaning and application of such review failed to garner
even mention in the United States Constitution.8 Yet, as Alexander M.
Bickel observed, "This is not to say that the power of judicial review cannot
be placed in the Constitution; merely that it cannot be found there."9 The
essence of the difficulty in defining and establishing the parameters for the
institution was that judicial review stands as a "countermajoritarian force"
in American democracy.10 One commentator, while weaving an historical
and jurisprudential justification for review, nonetheless acknowledged
that "judicial review is a deviant institution" in a democracy, given the
power conferred to the judiciary to apply and construe a constitution or law
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court
shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned,
the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make.
The Trial of all Crimes, except of Cases of Impeachment, shall be
by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes
shall have been committed; but when not committed with any State,
the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law
have directed.
Section. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them
Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in
open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of
Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or
Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.
U.S. CONsT. art. III.
6 Wood & Lange, Constitutional Litigation in the Context of Judicial Review, supra note I,
at 2.
7 Id. (citing G. ALAN TARR, JUDICIAL PROCESS AND JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING 281 (3rd ed.
2003)).
8 Id.
9 Id. (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS I (zd ed. 1986)).
10 Id. (citing BICKEL, SUpra note 9, at 16).
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against the wishes of the legislative majority and hence the citizenry of the
republic."
The United States Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison established
the authority of the courts to review the actions of the other branches of
government." In essence, to leave such decisions to a legislature would
be to allow those who the Constitution was constructed to limit to set
those very limits. 3 The concept of judicial review as a distinct arena of
intervention followed in the years subsequent to Marbury. 4
It has been observed that the "justiciability doctrine both reflects and
shapes underlying assumptions about the judicial function.""i  Within
this judicial institution rests the fact that its limits "are not universally
recognized or well defined."' 6  This is particularly evidenced in the
justiciable treatment of the political question and separation of powers
doctrines, which are of direct consequence to a contextual appreciation of
education finance litigation. 7 The "political question doctrine" is based
on the view that certain issues are non-justiciable and, thus, inappropriate
for judicial resolution; the courts find that the issue in question is more
properly the province of the legislative and executive offices, these
"political branches" being more structurally capable of addressing the
issues in question. 8 Phillip B. Kurland has noted that the non-justiciability
of a political question is a function of separation of powers.1 9
I I Id. (citing BICKEL, supra note 9, at 18).
12 Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 146-49 (1803)).
13 Id. (citing BICKEL, supra note 9, at 3).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 3 (quoting Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the
Judicial Function, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1833, 1909 (200)).
16 Id. (quoting State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 32 P.3d 325, 340 (Wyo. 2ooi)).
17 Id.
18 Id. The Supreme Court has noted that
[tihe political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those
controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determi-
nations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of [the
legislature] or the confines of the Executive Branch. The Judiciary is
particularly ill suited to make such decisions, as "courts are fundamen-
tally underequipped to formulate national [or state] policies or develop
standards for matters not legal in nature."
Japan Whaling Ass'n. v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (quoting United States
ex rJoseph v. Cannon, 642 Fzd 1373, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
19 Wood & Lange, Constitutional Litigation in the Context of Judicial Review, supra note I,
at 3. Phillip B. Kurland has described the arrangement, observing that "[s]eparation of pow-
ers certainly encompasses the notion that there are fundamental differences in governmental
functions-frequently but not universally denoted as legislative, executive, and judicial-
which must be maintained as separate and distinct, each sovereign in its own area, none to
operate in the realm assigned to another." Phillip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine"
200o)-zo010]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Irrespective of constitutional theory, the contemplation of education
finance litigation in the context of judicial review and characterizations of
courts as activist or restrained must be drawn through the prism of state
courts with varying constitutions. 0 When contemplating education finance
litigation within the context of what Justice Louis Brandeis referred to as
the "laboratories of democracy," cognizance of the unique nature of these
fifty venues is integral to any appreciation."'
The treatment of standing in federal and state courts is frequently
accorded divergent applications.22 While the understanding of this principle
in federal court is based upon the "case-or--controversy" requirement in
Article III of the United States Constitution, the source of standing rules
varies from state to state, as does the specific content. 3 Other limits of
justiciability that are evidenced in Article III courts are also absent or
attenuated in state judiciaries. 4 "State courts more typically find it their
duty to resolve constitutional questions that federal courts would consider
moot, elaborating constitutional norms as 'a matter of public interest' on
the view that the other branches will benefit from receiving 'authoritative
adjudication for further guidance."'25
Additionally, federal courts cannot render advisory opinions; however,
state courts often serve advisory roles, allowing them "to articulate
constitutional principles, while effectively 'remanding' disputes back to the
other branches."2 6 The institutional character of state judiciaries and the
political branches as well as the fact that states are not required "to imitate
the separation of powers prescribed for the federal government" leads to
further distinctions.21 State courts are often involved in administrative and
oversight tasks that would not be contemplated at the federal level.2"
The nature of the state constitutions themselves also distinguishes
the role of the state judiciary.2 9 Unlike the United States Constitution,
of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH L. REV. 592, 593 (1986).
20 Wood & Lange, Constitional Litigation in the Context of Judicial Review, supra note I, at
4.
21 ROBERT L. MADDEX, STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES Xi (1998).
22 Wood & Lange, Constitional Litigation in the Context of Judicial Review, supra note I, at
4.
23 Id. (citing State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.zd io6z, io8i-
82 (Ohio 1999); G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN
STATE AND NATION (1988)).
24 Id. at 5.
25 Hershkoff, supra note 15, at I86o (footnotes omitted).
z6 Wood & Lange, Constitional Litigation in the Context of Judicial Review, supra note I, at 5
(quoting Hershkoff, supra note 15, at 1851).





state documents are plenary and inherent.30 State constitutions resemble
regulatory statutes, prescribing social and economic policy, the specificity
of which creates a dynamic within which "[a] shortfall in enforcement may
not simply be remitted to politics; it instead implicates the judiciary in a
collaborative process of elaborating the constitutional mandate."3"
II. ACTIVIST AND RESTRAINED COURTS
In the realm of education finance litigation, judicial review is not
coextensive with judicial activism. 3 That said, a number of cases exhibit
a trend of venturing beyond simply stating what the law is, and into the
realm of dictating what it should be.33 Conversely, certain courts have
demonstrated a level of restraint, if not reticence, to expand beyond
a conscripted role, which is more remarkable given the venue of state
judiciaries.m
A. Examples of Judicial Restraint
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island provided the quintessential
example of judicial restraint in City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun.31 In that case,
the court upheld the state methodology for distributing state and local funds
for public education under the state constitution's education clause and
equal protection provision.36 The court stated that it would "not invalidate
a legislative enactment unless the party challenging the enactment can
prove beyond a reasonable doubt to this court that the statute in question
is repugnant to a provision in the constitution."37 Further, the court
acknowledged the importance of education, yet ruled that "the analysis
of the complex and elusive relationship between funding and 'learner
outcomes,' when all other variables are held constant, is the responsibility
of the Legislature. '
38
The court countenanced that to venture into that realm risked engaging
the judiciary in "a morass comparable to the decades-long struggle of
the Supreme Court of New Jersey that ha[d] attempted to define what
constitutes the 'thorough and efficient' education specified in that state's
30 Id.
31 Id. (quoting Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HAxv. L. REV. 1131,1156(1999)).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 5-6.
34 Id. at 6.
35 Id. (citing City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40,42 (R.I. 1995)).
36 Id. (citing Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 42).
37 Id. (citing Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 45).
38 Id. (citing Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 57).
200o)-o010]
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constitution. ' 39 Addressing equity, the court noted "the inherent risks of a
judicially imposed constitutional mandate that requires equity in funding
contingent on 'learner outcomes.""
The Illinois Supreme Court also presents an example of judicial
restraint in Committee for Education Rights v. Edgar.4 In a state constitution
where the education clause would seemingly require a high standard of
education for all students, 4 the high court found that significant revenue
disparities resulting from the state's reliance on local property wealth
to fund education did not offend either the education article or equal
protection provision of the state constitution 3.4  Plaintiffs relied upon
the education article's call for an "efficient system of high quality public
educational institutions and services," and the treatment of education as
a "fundamental goal" to argue that the disparities violated the text and
created educational inadequacies.'
The court declined to address the question of what constituted an
adequate or quality education, stating that it would not "presume to lay
down guidelines or ultimatums for [the legislature]" and that "it would be
a transparent conceit to suggest that whatever standards of quality courts
might develop would actually be derived from the constitution." 4 The
court explained, "[W]hile the framers of the 1970 Constitution recognized
the importance of 'the educational development of all persons to the
limits of their capacities,' they stopped short of declaring such educational
development to be a 'right,' choosing instead to identify it as a 'fundamental
goal."'" Characterizing the constitutional language as a "purely hortatory
statement of principle," not a specific command, the court resorted to San
39 Id. at 6-7 (citing Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 59).
40 Id. at 7 (citing Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 61).
41 Id. (citing Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 118o-8i (I11. 1996);
Coal. for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 68o So. 2d 400, 402 (Fla. 1996)
(providing a similar example of restrained judicial posture)).
42 Article X, § i of the Illinois Constitution stated in part:
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational
development of all persons to the limits of their capacities.
The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public
educational institutions and services....
The State has primary responsibility for financing the system of
public education.
ILL. CONST. art. X, § i.
43 Wood & Lange, ConstitionalLitigation in the Context of Judicial Review, supra note i, at 7
(citing Edgar, 672 N.E.zd at 1183).
44 Edgar, 672 N.E.zd at 1 j89 (quoting ILL. CONST. art. X, § i).
45 Wood & Lange, ConstitionalLiigation in the Context of JudicialReview, supra note i, at 7
(quoting Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1192).
46 Id. at 8 (quoting Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1195).
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Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez to turn aside the plaintiff's
contention that education's relationship with other aspects of citizenship
warranted its treatment as a fundamental right.47
B. Examples of Judicial Activism
Other state judiciaries have found themselves at the opposite extreme,
standing as exemplars of judicial activism. 41 In 1997 the Supreme Court
of Vermont struck down the state's public education finance distribution
methodology in Brigham v. State.49 The plaintiffs, in seeking equity rather
than adequacy, did not allege that the public education system was
inadequate or failed to provide basic academic skills.5 0 The supreme court
overturned a trial court's judgment for the state and, in doing so, presented
an interpretation of a simple education clause that could only be grounded
in legal realism, usurping the will of the legislature with its own and utilizing
the article not only as a subsidiary of an equal protection claim, but an
essential aspect of its ruling."s The Vermont constitution's education article
mandated that "a competent number of schools ought to be maintained
in eachtown unless the general assembly permits other provisions for the
convenient instruction of youth.""s The state supreme court took this
phrase and inferred a mandate far beyond the clear text. The court directed
the legislature "to make educational opportunity available on substantially
equal terms," and directed the lower court to retain jurisdiction "until valid
legislation is enacted and in effect." 3
In contrast to Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, Vermont's high
court rejected the contention that the clauses were meant to be "aspirational
ideas" 14 in marking education as "essential to self-government." 5 Yet, what
exactly constituted the characteristics of an adequate education to meet
this challenge was not specifically detailed; rather, the court presumed that
the disparities in and of themselves evidenced inadequacy.5 6
The Wyoming Supreme Court presents an extreme level of activism
as reflected in a series of rulings.5 7 The court has interjected itself into
47 Id. (citing Edgar, 682 N.E.zd at 1187, 1194).
48 Id.
49 Id. (citing Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384,397 (Vt. 1997)).
50 Id. (citing Brigham, 692 A.2d at 387).
51 See Brigham. 692 A.2d at 386-87.
52 Wood & Lange, ConstitionalLitigation in the Context of JudicialReview, supra note i, at 8
(quoting VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68).
53 Id. (quoting Brigham, 692 A.zd at 398).
54 Brigham, 692 A.2d at 394.
55 Id. at 393-
56 Id. at 389-9o .
57 Wood & Lange, Constitional Litigation in the Context of Judicial Review, supra note i, at
2000-zo201]
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education policy and crafted challenging goals and requirements from sparse
constitutional text.5" In 1980 with Washakie County School District No. One v.
Herschler, the court struck down the state's education finance distribution
funding formula, ruling it unconstitutional under the equal protection
clause of the Wyoming Constitution. 9 Then in 1995, for the second time in
less than two decades, the Wyoming Supreme Court again invalidated the
state public education funding provisions in Campbell County School District
v. State.60 Referencing the financing redesign implemented in the wake of
Washakie, the state acknowledged that disparities still remained but argued
that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate "that the challenged features
significantly deprived, infringed upon, or interfered with their educational
rights."' 6' The court ruled that the state's education article demanded "a
uniform opportunity to become equipped for their future roles as citizens,
participants in the political system, and competitors both economically and
intellectually."6 The opinion declared that "[slupporting an opportunity
for a complete, proper, quality education is the legislature's paramount
priority."63
In compliance litigation six years following Campbell I, the Wyoming
Supreme Court ruled that the state had yet to fulfill the judicial order "to
provide and fund an education system which is of a quality appropriate
for the times."64 The state argued that what fiscal disparities remained
were due to acceptable cost differences and not reflective of local wealth.65
The court acknowledged this point, yet found that differences "may be
due to political decisions or a failure to adequately measure differences
9.
58 Id.
59 Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Hersehler, 606 P.2d 310,315 (Wyo. 1980).
60 Wood & Lange, ConstitionalLitigation in the Context of Judicial Review, supra note i, at 9
(citing Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State (Campbell1), 907 P.2d 1238, 1244 (Wyo. 1995)).
61 Id. (quoting Campbell 1, 907 P.2d at 125o).
62 Id. (quoting Campbell1, 907 P.2d at 1259). Article VII, § i of the Wyoming Constitution
stated,
The legislature shall provide for the establishment and mainte-
nance of a complete and uniform system of public instruction, embrac-
ing free elementary schools of every needed kind and grade, a university
with such technical and professional departments as the public good
may require and the means of the state allow, and such other institutions
as may be necessary.
WYo. CONST. art. VII, § i.
63 Wood & Lange, ConstitionalLitigation in the Context of Judicial Review, supra note I, at 9
(citing Campbell, 907 P.zd at 1259).
64 Id. (citing State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist. (Campbell11), 19 P3d 518, 538 (Wyo.
2oo1)).
6S Id. (citing Campbelll, 19 P.3d at 536).
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in cost because of time constraints or gaps in the data, and those reasons
are no more acceptable than wealth differences."" In a decision which
scrutinized all aspects of the state public education system, the court
reserved for its consideration what constituted an education "appropriate
for the times," asserting that the constitutional question was one the court
alone must answer.67 These cases are distinguished by a determination
to create constitutional standards beyond the discovery of those that
are presently articulated therein, a stress on the primacy of education to
other state concerns, and an adherence to an independent vertical judicial
federalism while simultaneously demonstrating a pronounced horizontal
federalism posture.'
The course of education finance litigation in New York State culminated
in the 2003 court of appeals' decision in Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v.
State.69 It began, however, in 1995 when the Court of Appeals of New York
was "called upon to decide whether plaintiffs'. . . complaint pleads viable
causes of action under the Education Article of the State Constitution, the
Equal Protection Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions, and Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its implementing regulations."70 In
finding for the plaintiffs on the first and last of these charges, the court
addressed the interpretation of the education article proffered in Board
of Education of Levittown Free School District v. Nyquist.71 The court, in
an opinion that expanded a judicial appreciation of a "basic education,"
asserted that education "should consist of basic literacy, calculating, and
verbal skills necessary to enable children to eventually function productively
as civic participants capable of voting and serving on a jury."7 Absent in
66 Id. at 9-io (citing Campbelll1, 19 3d at 536).
67 Id. at 1o (citing Campbelll, 19 P.3d at 539).
68 As noted, horizontal judicial federalism refers to the utilization of sister state consti-
tutional interpretations in analysis of constitutional text; activist courts have perceived their
own constitutional jurisprudence to be dependent upon the constitutional understandings
of other states. See, for example, McDuffy v. Sec'y of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554-55 (Mass.
1993), and Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor 635 A.2d 1375, 1378 (N.H. 1993), both of which
are decisions where the courts utilized the definition of adequacy as marked by the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Rosev. Councilfor Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212-13 (Ky. 1989). See
also Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859,874-76 (W.Va. 1979) (consulting the constitutions of Ohio,
Minnesota, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Illinois, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Arkansas, Texas,
Kentucky, Delaware and Virginia).
69 Wood & Lange, Constitional Litigation in the Context of Judicial Review, supra note i, at
to (citing Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (CFE 111), 8oi N.E.zd 326, 350 (N.Y. 2003)).
70 Id. (quoting Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (CFE 1), 655 N.E.zd 661, 663 (N.Y.
1995)).
71 CFE 1, 655 N.E.2d at 664-66 (discussing Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 6o6,
634-46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978), modified, 443 N.Y.S.zd 843 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), modified, 439
N.E. ad 359 (N.Y. 1982)).
72 Wood & Lange, Constitional Litigation in the Context of Judicial Review, supra note 1, at
1o (quoting CFE I, 655 N.E.2d at 666).
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the decision was any explanation of its rationale for this expansion of the
construction of the education article or the substantive nature of the skills
necessary to meet this broadened standard.73 On remand, the New York
State Supreme Court found the state public education financing system
to be unconstitutional, not only in reference to New York City, but also
statewide.74
The state appealed to the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate
Division. In reversing the lower court, the appellate division noted the New
York State Supreme Court's interpretation of what constituted a "sound
basic education."" The court of appeals broadened the constitutional
construction of the education article in CFE I and, on remand, the trial
court embraced a standard that was described by the appellate division as
follows:
[An education must be provided which enables people to evaluate complex
campaign issues, such as tax policy, global warming and charter reform,
and to have the verbal, reasoning, math, science, and socialization skills
necessary to determine questions of fact on such matters of DNA evidence,
statistical analysis, and convoluted financial fraud.76
Whereas the high court in CFE I, had directed that children must be
educated to "function productively as civic participants," the trial court was
compelled to interpret that directive to mean "competitive employment,"
which was more than "low-level jobs."77
Finding that there was no evidence presented to demonstrate that
students in New York City were "unable to perform basic mathematic
calculations" and pointing to the provision of components of a sound basic
education such as "history and civics, and science and technology," the
appellate division ruled that the "plaintiffs ... failed to establish that the
New York City public school children are not receiving the opportunity for a
sound basic education."78 In addressing educational outputs, the appellate
division reasoned that "the proper standard is that the State must offer
all children the opportunity of a sound basic education, not ensure that
they actually receive it. ... The standard is a 'sound basic education,' not
73 Id.
74 Id. at ii (citing Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (DeC rasse Decision), 719 N.Y.S.2d
475, 478 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. zoo ), rev'd 744 N.YS.2d 130 (N.Y App. Div. 2002),aff'din part, modi-
fledinpart, 8oi N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003), aff'd in part, modified in part, vacated in part, 861 N.E.
2d 50 (N.Y. 2oo6)).
75 Id. (citing Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (CFE H/), 744 N.Y.S.zd 130, 134-39
(N.Y, App. Div. 2002), aff'd in part, modified in part, 8oi N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003), aff'd in part,
modifled in part, 861 N.E.zd 5o(zoo6)).
76 Id. (quoting CFE II, 744 N.Y.S.2d at 137).
77 Id. (quoting DeGrasse Decision, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 485-87).
78 Id. (quoting CFE HI, 744 N.Y.S.2d at 139).
[Vol. 98
JUSTICIABILITY, ADEQUACY, ADVOCACY
graduation from high school."7 9 The state could not "be faulted if students
do not avail themselves of the opportunities presented." 80
The New York State Supreme Court and the State Supreme Court,
Appellate Division had rendered two vastly divergent decisions, rulings
clearly at the extremes of activism and restraint."1 A significant issue for
the Court of Appeals of New York, along this continuum of review, was
the choice to expand upon the constitutional construction of the education
article in question, and to what degree a court dare venture into the realm
of education policy and administration."' At the outset of the case, the
court of appeals found "paramount" the question of "whether the trial court
correctly defined a sound basic education" and, further, the determination
of "which court's findings more nearly comport with the weight of the
credible evidence."83 Agreeing with the trial court's interpretation of a
"sound basic education," the court of appeals observed that "the record
establishes that for this purpose a high school level education is now all but
indispensable."' The state demonstrated that ninety percent of the New
York City school students who reached the eleventh grade demonstrated
competency in reading and mathematics by passing either the Regents
Competency Test or the Regents Examination; further, it relied upon
the results of a number of nationally-normed reading and math tests.8,
The court of appeals dismissed both approaches, finding that neither
approach reflected the newly minted standard of a "meaningful high school
education," and that "the New York [c]onstitution ensures students not an
education that approaches the national norm-whatever that may be-but a
sound basic education." 86 The opportunity for "a basic education" detailed
in Levittown had now been expanded to the assurance of "a meaningful
high school education," equipping students to decipher DNA evidence,
campaign finance litigation, statistical analysis and financial fraud. 7
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opined in McDuffy v.
Secretary of Education that "[t]he content of the duty to educate which
the Constitution places on the Commonwealth necessarily will evolve
together with our society."" Courts in Arizona and Ohio revised previous
79 Id. at i 1-12 (quoting CFE 11, 744 N.Y.S.zd at 143).
8o Id. at 12 (quoting CFE 11, 744 N.Y.S.2d at 143).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. (quoting Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (CFE III), 8oi N.E.2d 326, 329 (N.Y.
2003), aff'd in part, modified in part, 861 N.E.2d 50 (2o6)).
84 Id. (quoting CFE IIt, 8oi N.E.2d at 331).
85 Id. at 12-13 (citing CFE 111, 8oi N.E.2d at 338-39).
86 Id. at 13 (quoting CFE III, 8oi N.E.zd at 339).
87 See CFE 11, 744 N.Y.S.zd at 137.
88 Wood & Lange, Constitional Litigation in the Context of Judicial Review, supra note i, at
13 (citing McDuffy v. Sec'y of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516,555 (Mass. 1993)).
2009--20101
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
interpretations of state educational articles presented by the states' high
courts and utilized the reinterpretations to strike down state funding
systems.8 9 These broadening treatments of constitutional construction,
clearly exemplified in the discussion of New York, 90 as well as a more
recent push back regarding the limitations of such attempts, is evidenced
in McDuffy. 9'
Of particular significance is the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision
in Vincent v. Voight, which is noteworthy in that its expansion of the
constitutional mandate occurred within a decision that found for the
state in a school funding challenge under both the equal protection and
education articles. 92 The new right to education included "the opportunity
for students to be proficient in mathematics, science, reading and writing,
geography, and history, and for them to receive instruction in the arts
and music, vocational training, social sciences, health, physical education
and foreign language, in accordance with their age and aptitude."93 The
Wisconsin Constitution provided in part that "[t]he legislature shall
provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as
nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall be free and without
charge for tuition to all children between the ages of [four] and [twenty]." 94
Unclear in the decision in Vincent is how the court's expansive construction
is supported within this text, apart from the citation of other state court
interpretations and the court's stated necessity of embracing an adequacy-
based constitutional standard "as a goad [sic] or as a backstop to the
legislature[]." '
C. Special Examples: Montana, Indiana and Florida96
The state of Montana has faced litigation involving the state's education
finance distribution formula for many years. 97 The latest challenge involved
89 Id. at 13-14 (citing Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 8o6, 812-16
(Ariz. 1994); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.zd 733, 747 (Ohio 1997)).
90 See supra pp. 749-5 '.
91 Wood & Lange, Constitional Litigation in the Context of Judicial Review, supra note i, at
14.
92 Id. (citing Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.zd 388,396-97 (Wis. zooo)).
93 Id. (quoting Vincent, 614 N.Wzd at 396-97).
94 Id. (quoting Wis. CONsT. art. X, § 3).
95 Id. (citing Vincent, 614 N.W.2d at 407).
96 Much of the discussion of Montana in this subsection is directly quoted from Thro &
Wood, supra note i, but quotation marks and indications of modifications have been removed
for purposes of clarity and readability.
97 See Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. i v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), modified, 784 Pad
412 (Mont. 199o) (ruling that the existing finance system was unconstitutional). In 1991, two
suits were filed, Helena Elementary School District No. t v. State and Montana Rural Education
Association v. State, challenging the school funding system adopted by the legislature, but in
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whether the state legislature was funding a "quality" education as defined
by the legislature and this question has persisted for at least the past five
years.9 The state of Montana has certain fundamental issues regarding the
manner in which the state legislature distributes and oversees local and
state monies to fund public elementary and secondary education. 99 Some
of these fundamental issues derive from the fact that currently the state
has 324 school districts consisting of fifty-two K-12 districts, 105 combined
districts with joint school boards, 158 elementary school districts, two
state-funded school districts, and seven non-operating or annexed school
districts for a total state school student enrollment of approximately
142,000."o This presents the critical public policy issue revolving around
which school districts are small and inefficient due to the geographical
realities of a sparsely populated state and which school districts are small
and inefficient due to choice.1"' This means that the issues of economies
of scale are embedded throughout the distribution formula and may not
be reflected in any remedy that the plaintiffs would find acceptable. 02
Thus, the plaintiff's position has been and will continue to be that the state
should fund all school districts, regardless of the inherent inefficiencies of
certain school districts and regardless of the local educational program. 103
Compounding this issue is the fact that the state has a large number of
American Indian children reflecting high per pupil expenditures and
relatively low achievement scores."
On April 15, 2004, the Montana District Court in Columbia Falls
Elementary School District No. 6 v. State issued its lengthy opinion regarding
whether the state's education finance distribution formula met the state
constitutional mandate involving public education. 05 The constitutional
mandate in question reads as follows:
(1) It is the goal of the people to establish a system of education which
the course of these events the Montana Legislature adopted House Bill 667 changing the
state's education finance distribution formula and the court declared these challenges moot.
Montana Rural Educ. Assn. v. State, No. BDV-9I-zo65, 1992 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 439, at *5-6,
*15-16 (Mont. i s Jud. Dist. Dec. 22, 1992).
98 Thro & Wood, supra note 1, at 19.
99 Id. at 19-20.




1o4 Id.; see MONT. INDIAN EDuc. ASS'N, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SCHOOL FUNDING
FORMULA TO THE QUALITY SCHOOLS INTERIM COMMITTEE (2005), available at http://www.mtiea.
org/downloads/miearecommendationstoqualityschools.pdf.
105 Columbia Falls Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, No. BDV-2002-528, 2004 WL 844055,




will develop the full educational potential of each person. Equality of
educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the state.
(2) The state recognizes the distinct and unique cultural heritage of
the American Indians and is committed in its educational goals to the
preservation of their cultural integrity.
(3) The legislature shall provide a basic system of free quality public
elementary and secondary schools. The legislature may provide such other
educational institutions, public libraries, and educational programs as it
deems desirable. It shall fund and distribute in an equitable manner to
the school districts the state's share of the cost of the basic elementary and
secondary school system.'06
The court noted in its 2004 decision that the state of Montana had
numerous school districts with a total enrollment of nearly 150,000.107
These school districts consisted of elementary school districts, secondary
school districts and K-12 school districts."' 8 Enrollments varied from two
students to 9974 across all school districts. °9 These figures must also be
understood within the context of separate school boards for each school
district as well as the existence of County Superintendents of Schools who
are elected in certain counties."0 A County Superintendent may exist in
a county with several different school boards representing different school
districts.'
The state required a 95 mills property tax, which was levied statewide."'
Of this amount 55 mills was for county equalization with the balance
remitted to the state and credited to the state general fund."' Additionally,
there were school trust fund land revenues."l 4 The largest single source of
federal monies was P.L. 874 funds."5
The court examined the state accreditation standards and reasoned
that the state accreditation standards required school districts to offer
certain programs and classes, hire and train licensed teachers, and meet a
variety of state standards." 6 The court further reasoned these standards
did not define quality, but rather were minimal standards imposed by the
state legislature. 117 With this reasoning, the court concluded that the state
io6 MONT. CONsT. art. X, § i.




iii Thro & Wood, supra note I, at 21.








standards were not defined and adequately funded by the legislature.,1 8
The court noted, "Complying with the accreditation standards has imposed
additional financial burdens on school districts without corresponding
increases in state aide to meet the new standards." 119 The court heavily
relied on the plaintiffs' single "professional judgment" panel to project the
cost of providing an adequate education in the state.2 0 Thus, the court was
persuaded that the state had not defined an adequate education and that the
state had not funded education at a level that could be deemed adequate.'
However, the court noted that the plaintiffs had not established the state
education finance distribution system was inequitable.'
In summary, the court held that the school funding system did not violate
the equal protection clause of the Montana Constitution.2 3 However, the
court stated that the funding system and the classification contained therein
were not based on educationally relevant facts. 24 The court also noted
that the state had not recognized the distinct and unique cultural heritage
of American Indians of the state.'25 The court further opined that the
state had failed to provide adequate funding for the public schools of the
state. 2 6 The court was of the opinion that the state did not pay its obligated
share toward public elementary and secondary education.'27 In its final
conclusion, the court stated, "To satisfy [the] Montana Constitution, the
State's school finance system must be based upon a determination of the
needs and costs of the public school system, and the school finance system
must be designed and based upon educationally-relevant factors."'
28
The state appealed and the coalition cross-appealed; the Montana
Supreme Court heard the case in October of 2004.29 The supreme court
ruled that the question of funding schools was a justiciable issue rather than
a non-justiciable political question and it found that the overall system
was constitutionally inadequate in that the system did not satisfy the state
i18 Id.
ii9 Columbia Falls Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 6, 2004 WL 844055, at "14.
120 See id. at *30.





126 Id. at 22-23.
127 Id. at 23.
128 Columbia Falls Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, No. BDV-2002-528, 2oo4WL 844055,
at *25 (Mont. D.C. Apr. 15, 2004), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 2005 MT 69, 326 Mont. 304,
109 P.3d 257.
129 Columbia Falls Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 2005 MT 69 11 12-35,326 Mont. 304,
12-35, 109 P.3d 257,1 12-35.
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constitution. 130 However, it deferred to the state legislature to provide the
definition of a "quality" education and to fund the system at the defined
level.'3 ' Specifically, the court stated as follows:
[B]ecause the Legislature has not defined what "quality" means we
cannot conclude that the current system is designed to provide a "quality"
education. Article X, Section 1(3), explicitly requires the Legislature to
fund a "quality" educational system. Therefore we defer to the Legislature
to provide a threshold definition of what the Public Schools Clause requires.
We also conclude, however, that given the unchallenged findings made by
the District Court, whatever definition the Legislature devises, the current
funding system is not grounded in principles of quality, and cannot be
deemed constitutionally sufficient.13
During the next legislative session the state conducted an extensive
examination to determine the adequacy of the present system with
recommendations for how the state education finance distribution formula
could be addressed in terms of adequacy. 3  As a result of this study as
well as extensive work by the Legislature, the funding system underwent
extensive revisions in the next Legislative session. However, plaintiffs filed
suit arguing that the Legislature had not implemented the court's order
and that the state education finance distribution formula continued to be
unconstitutional.'I 4 In February 2008, plaintiffs asked for supplemental
relief.3 s
In May 2008, the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark
County, issued its decision regarding plaintiffs' claims that the new
funding mechanism had not met the directive of the Montana Supreme
Court.3 6 The court stated that the revisions to the education finance
distribution formula were not "substantial" based on the affidavits of the
plaintiffs' expert witnesses.'37 The court noted "that although the State
has contributed more money to the system, it is not clear whether it has
addressed the structural deficiencies in the funding formula."'' 3 8
130 Id. atl 31.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 See R. C. WOOD & Assocs., DETERMINING THE COST OF PROVIDING AN ADEQUATE
EDUCATION IN THE STATE OF MONTANA 3 (2005) [hereinafter R.C. WOOD & Assocs., MONTANA
REPORT], available at http;llwww.rcwoodassoc.com/pdf/Montana.pdf (prepared for the Quality
Schools Interim Committee and the Montana State Legislature).
134 See Stroebe v. State, zoo6 MT 19, ' 7-8, 331 Mont. 23, TI, 7-8, 127 P.3d 1051, 11
7-8.
135 Columbia Falls Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, No. BDV-zoo2- 5 28, at 2 (Mont. ist
Jud. Dist. May 5, 20o8) (order denying defendant's motion to dismiss).
136 Id.




In summation the court stated as follows:
The Court must be mindful to use its judicial resources wisely. At this
stage of the proceedings, it does not appear to the Court to be a wise use
of its resources to have the parties begin a new lawsuit that would take
months, if not years, to prepare and weeks to try. Plaintiffs are suggesting
that the State of Montana has not complied with this Court's Order or the
order of the Montana Supreme Court. The task of ensuring compliance
with its orders is not a task that is foreign to this Court. Although this
case is more complicated than the vast majority of cases before this Court,
Plaintiffs' request for an examination of whether the State's actions have
met the standards required by this Court and the supreme court does not
seem to be unreasonable and out of the ambit of what courts frequently do
in other civil cases.
The Court, however, needs to address a couple of matters. ... [T]he
Court does not feel it appropriate that the burden of proof be on the State
of Montana. It is Plaintiffs' contention that the funding formula has not
changed in order to meet the mandates of the supreme court. The Plaintiffs
will be required to prove that to this Court.
Further, this Court, as it writes these words, is unsure of the precise
nature of any supplemental relief that might be awarded after the hearing
if the Court agrees with the Plaintiffs. The Court makes this statement for
the reason that it does not want the parties to assume that, even if the Court
should agree with the Plaintiffs that the system has not been changed as
required by the Montana Supreme Court, the remedies sought by Plaintiffs
in their motion for order to show cause will be granted.139
In December 2008 the court issued its findings. 14° At this point, the case
was over five years old and this decision was in response to the plaintiffs'
motion for supplemental relief and order to show cause.14 ' Following the
adjournment of the 2007 legislative session, the court issued an order
denying the plaintiffs' motion as being premature. 14 Following this denial,
the plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for supplemental relief and an order
to show cause. 143 The court heard these arguments and issued an order
rejecting the state's opposition and set the matter for a hearing to examine
whether supplemental relief should be granted and placed the burden of
proof on the plaintiffs. 44
The court noted that the previous issues addressed by that court and
the Montana Supreme Court were:
139 Id. at 5-6.
I4O Columbia Falls Elem. Sch. Dist. No.6 v. State, No BDV-zooz-5z8, 2008 Mont. Dist.
LEXIS 483, at*i (Mont. ist. Jud. Dist. Dec. 15, 2008).
141 Id. at *I-2.





1. Definition of a quality education.
2. The number of school districts budgeting at their maximum authority.
3. Problems with accreditation standards.
4. Problems attracting and retaining teachers.
5. Cutting of educational programs.
6. Deterioration of buildings.
7. Increasing competition over general fund dollars between special
education and general education.
8. Lack of an inflationary provision in the school funding formula.
9. Whether the funding provided by the State relates to the needs of
providing a quality education.
10. Failure to have a study to determine the costs of providing a quality
education.
11. Ability to provide a quality education.
12. Implementation of Article X, section 1(2), of the Montana
Constitution.
13. Declining share of the State's contribution to school districts.
14. Provision for at-risk and gifted students. 145
The court further noted that the parties were in agreement that the
legislature had "properly defined the basic system of free quality public
elementary and secondary schools,"'" and had "met its obligation ..
. by providing adequate funds for Indian Education for All Montana
students." 1
47
The court then discussed the extensive changes that the legislature
had enacted in funding public elementary and secondary education
in the state. 148 The court spent considerable time examining the 2005
legislative session, which created the Joint Select Committee on Education
Funding. 149 This committee proposed, the legislature adopted, and the
Governor signed Senate Bill 525 creating the Quality Schools Interim
Committee ("QSIC"). s° Pursuant to its charge, the QSIC hired R. C. Wood
& Associates to conduct an examination regarding the cost of meeting the
educational needs of the state."'
The R.C. Wood & Associates' study examined four distinct
methodologies in determining the costs of providing an adequate
education in the state: "statistical analysis; evidence-based analysis;
successful schools analysis; and professional judgment analysis." 151
145 Id. at *3-4.
146 Id. at *4 (referring to MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-9-309(2) (2009)).
i47 Id. (referring to MONT. CoNsT. art. X, § 1(2)).
148 Id. at *4-15.
149 Ste id. at * 15.
150 Id.
151 Id. at *17.
152 Id. at *17-18.
[Vol. 98
JUSTICIABILITY, ADEQUACY, ADVOCACY
Additionally, the study conducted a needs assessment survey with a return
rate of eighty-three percent of the school districts of the state."3 The
needs assessment study estimated approximately $34 million in increased
cost, plus the costs of "recruitment and retention of qualified educators." I4
The study provided cost estimates based on each methodology. At the
time of the study, it was the first education finance study in any state to
examine the cost of adequacy based on all four current models offering
a range of estimates for a legislature. Additionally, the study contained
an examination of the costs of closing the American Indian student
achievement gap.' 5 The study noted that certain issues regarding the cost
of funding an adequate education were interwoven with small inefficient
and isolated schools and districts. 1 6 Additional studies by various state
agencies examined numerous funds and issues applicable to the public
schools of the state. 157
The court spent considerable time in examining and noting the
expenditures, new programs, and earmarked funds for a variety of programs
clearly related to the issue of a quality education. 5 8 New components to
the overall distribution formula were fully funded by the state and these
included: quality educator, at-risk, American Indian Achievement Gap, and
Indian Education for All.'5 9 The court noted that the legislative education
finance distribution formula incorporated many of the costs determined by
the QSIC process. 160 The plaintiffs had argued that the funding system was
not based on the "costs of meeting the standards."' 61 However, evidence
indicated that the legislature had appropriated monies for a variety of
purposes based on the various reports, all of which were based upon cost
estimates. 16  The State relied heavily upon the studies conducted by
R.C. Wood & Associates, as well as Stoddard and Young of Montana State
University in terms of examples of extensive costing-out studies.
163
In an overall observation the court stated as follows:
As noted earlier, the R.C. Wood study indicated that there were four
possible ways to cost-out the price of education. The cost determined by the
evidence-based method was $20 million; by the statistic-based method $34
153 Id. at *18.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See R.C. WOOD & Assocs., MONTANA REPORT supra note 133, at 11-15.
157 See Columbia Falls Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 6, 2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 483, at *2o-24.
158 See id. at *33-47.
159 See id. at *43-44.
i6o Id. at 165.
161 Id. at 64.
162 Id. at *66-69.
163 Seeid. at *65-67.
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million; and by the successful schools model $96 million. The professional
judgment study relied on by Plaintiffs seeks in excess of $300 million
additional dollars. When this Court held its original hearing in this matter in
2004, the only study that had been done was a professional judgment study.
Now, the Court notes that the three other studies mentioned above have
been done. This Court is not in a position to tell the legislature which of the
studies to choose. If the legislature were to choose the costs based on any
of the studies other than the professional judgment study, all of which were
under $100 million, the legislature, since it has provided $148 million in
new ongoing State funding since 2005, has exceeded the costs of providing
an education as determined by the three studies other than the professional
judgment methodology.
This Court finds that the State has determined the cost of providing
an education in the state of Montana. That determination is not only in
QSIC study, but it is also in the various studies mentioned in the R.C. Wood
study and otherwise prepared in conjunction with the R.C. Wood study, and
through the whole QSIC process. The legislature, then, had a smorgasbord
of numbers from which to choose. Probably the biggest problem in this case
is that there is not a bright line connecting many of the cost figures to the
money actually allocated by the legislature.1"
The court noted,
[One] complicating factor in Montana is the fact that the state of
Montana has hundreds of school districts. Perhaps this is necessary and
perhaps not, but the immense variety in the makeup of Montana school
districts, from rural to non-rural, from east to west and north to south, along
with a huge number of school districts, is a guarantee of future disputes. 6
In summation, the court stated the following:
The Court is also faced with what remedy to provide. The Court
concludes that it will not order any supplemental or additional relief. This
Court concludes that the legislature and the state of Montana have made a
good faith attempt to address the various problems mentioned by this Court
and the supreme court. Tens of millions of dollars of additional funding
have been supplied to the school districts. Further, the exact remedy that
this Court could provide is unclear. Given that lack of clarity and the good
faith steps taken by the State, the Court concludes that the current problems
do not warrant this Court to take any action at this time. This court, as this
opinion is being written, has no idea what the 2009 legislature has in store
for the schools of Montana.'6
Thus, the court upheld the current education finance distribution formula
164 Id. at *66-68 (citation omitted).
165 Id. at *7I.
166 Id. at '73-74.
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citing the facts that the legislature had engaged in determining the cost of
an adequate education in the state of Montana. 167 The legislature was not
under an obligation to fund programs that school districts had adopted.
6
'
It was under an obligation to fund programs that were required by state
standards and to determine the amount of funding necessary to meet those
stated state standards. 6 9
The most recent decision from Indiana was issued in June 2009 in
the matter of Bonner ex rel Bonner v. Daniels.10 In that case, plaintiffs
argued that the education finance distribution formula failed to fund the
state standards and thus the education finance distribution formula was
inadequate."' The plaintiffs attended eight different school corporations
(school districts) within the state.' The trial court dismissed the complaint
and the court of appeals reversed.173 The plaintiffs appealed the trial court's
decision and "sought a declaratory judgment to establish that the Indiana
Constitution imposes an enforceable duty on state government to provide
a standard of quality education."'74 The court stated,
Although recognizing the Indiana Constitution directs the General Assembly
to establish a general and uniform system of public schools, we hold that it
does not mandate any judicially enforceable standard of quality, and to the
extent that an individual student has a right, entitlement, or privilege to
pursue public education, this derives from the enactments of the General
Assembly, not from the Indiana Constitution. s"5
The plaintiffs claimed that the education finance distribution formula
violated the Indiana Constitution. The court quoted the plaintiffs'
complaint to describe the nature of how they saw the action as follows:
[1] that the Indiana Constitution imposes an enforceable duty on the
General Assembly to provide an education that prepares all of Indiana's
children-rich or poor, white, black or Hispanic, with or without special
needs, and with or without English proficiency-to function in a complex
and rapidly changing society, to discharge the duties and responsibilities
167 Id. at *74-75.
168 Id. at *75.
169 Id.
17o Bonner ex r/Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.zd 516, S16 (Ind. 2009).
171 Id. at 59. This concept appears to be largely based upon an unpublished costing out
study commissioned by the Indiana State Teachers Association.
'72 Bonner v. Daniels, No. 49Do1o6o4PLo16414, 2007 WL 6913265, at *I (Ind. Cir. Ct.
Jan. 29,2007), vacated, 907 N.E.zd 516 (Ind. zoo9).
173 Bonner ex re/Bonner v. Daniels, 885 N.E.2d 673,676-77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2oo8), vacated,
907 N.E.2d 516 (Ind. 2009).




of citizenship, and to compete successfully with their peers for productive
employment and opportunities for advancement through higher education.
[21 that the Defendants are violating their constitutional duty because
Indiana's current system of financing education violates the Indiana
Constitution, with the result that the plaintiffs, and the tens of thousands of
other Indiana school children whom plaintiffs represent, are not receiving
their constitutional entitlement of education as intended by the framers of
the Constitution.
176
The court noted that the plaintiffs stated that they did not seek a
"judicial mandate for a particular school funding system, but express that
what they seek 'is a determination that the current system falls woefully
short of the requirements of the Indiana Constitution."'17 7 The plaintiffs
based their argument on the following passage of the state constitution:
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community, being
essential to the preservation of a free government; it shall be the duty of the
General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual,
scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide, by law, for a general
and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be without
charge, and equally open to all. 178
The court noted the complaint and observed the following:
The plaintiffs' complaint, and their appellants' brief, do not allege violation of
the "general and uniform system" or the "equally open to all" requirements,
nor of any other specific provision in the Education Clause. Instead, the
plaintiffs' claim of unconstitutionality is a general one-that the Clause
imposes a duty to provide public school students with an education of
satisfactory quality and that Indiana state government, because of its system
of public school financing, has failed to satisfy such duty. The plaintiffs
specifically insist that their claims are "brought under the entire Education
Clause," and not focused on any single specific phrase in the Clause. 79
The court explained that the education clause of the state constitution had
two parts, the first part being "general and aspirational" and the second part
being more "concrete." 11° The court went on to observe that the education
clause did not require a "standard of educational achievement" and that
"[tihe Clause says nothing whatsoever about educational quality.1"
176 Id. at 519.
177 Id. (citation omitted).
178 IND. CONsT. art. 8, § i.
179 Bonnetr, 907 N.E.2d at 52o (citing Reply Brief of Appellants/Plaintiffs at 6, Bonnet v.





The Indiana Supreme Court noted in Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh
School Corp. that the history and meaning of the education clause were well
documented and settled as a matter of law.8" Relying on Nagy, the Bonner
court stated,
The historical facts do not evidence any intention to require the
establishment of a public education system with any particular standards
of educational output. We decline the plaintiffs' invitation to amplify
the words and meaning of our Constitution as crafted by its framers and
approved by its ratifiers.
Guided as we are by the text of the constitutional provision in the
context of its history, we conclude that the Education Clause of the Indiana
Constitution does not impose upon government an affirmative duty to
achieve any particular standard of resulting educational quality. This
determination is delegated to the sound legislative discretion of the General
Assembly. And in the absence of such a constitutional duty, there is no basis
for the judiciary to evaluate whether it has been breached.
[W]e conclude that the framers and ratifiers certainly sought to establish
a state system of free common schools but not to create a constitutional
right to be educated to a certain quality or other output standard. 183
Interestingly, Justice Boehm, who concurred in a separate opinion,
noted the following:
The plaintiffs have chosen to sue the Governor and the Superintendent of
Public Instruction. It is appropriate to sue executive officers to enjoin them
from enforcing an unconstitutional statute. But the plaintiffs here do not
seek to enjoin the state's funding of the current system. Rather, they seek
affirmative relief in the form of a mandate to implement a system of public
education that meets their standards. That is more than these defendants
can deliver, even if they admitted the allegations of the complaint and agreed
to a consent judgment. The General Assembly must first act to create a
system, which can then be tested for conformity to the constitution.' 14
Thus, the Indiana Supreme Court appears to have forestalled any
attempt at overturning the present education finance distribution formula
based on a general concept of adequacy. The court precluded the plaintiffs
from defining a set standard, or standards, by which the legislature must
fund to operationalize the performance of the system, declined to find an
enforceable legislative duty to provide an education at a given level of
quality, and held that the constitution did not establish an individual right
182 Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 844 N.E.zd 481, 484-88 (Ind. 2oo6).
183 Bonner, 907 N.E.ad at 522 (emphasis omitted).
184 Id. at 524 (Boehm, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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to an education. 8 5
In 1996, the state's education finance distribution formula was upheld
by the Florida Supreme Court in Coalition forAdequacy and Fairness in School
Funding, Inc. v Chiles.186 However, in 1998 voters in the State of Florida
approved the following state constitutional mandate concerning public
elementary and secondary education:
The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State
of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate
provision for the education of all children residing within its borders.
Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe,
secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students
to obtain a high quality education and for the establishment, maintenance,
and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education
programs that the needs of the people may require.'
In 2008 a novel challenge based on a perceived lack of educational
adequacy was filed against a single selected school district in Florida in
Schroeder v. Palm Beach County School Board.a In that case, the plaintiffs,
consisting of students and parents, challenged the educational services
provided to selected students as being inadequate under the state
constitution. 8 9 The Palm Beach County School District, at the time of
the suit, included approximately 175,000 students and 164 schools."9
The American Civil Liberties Union, on behalf of the plaintiffs, sought a
declaration, via a class action, that the Palm Beach County School District
was not providing an adequate education under the requirements of the
state constitution.' 9' Plaintiffs stated that the Palm Beach County School
District failed "to provide a uniform, efficient, safe, secure and high quality
education to the children of Palm Beach County as mandated by the
Florida Constitution.'' l z The plaintiffs contended that this was evidenced
by the low graduation rates within the school district. 93 Citing the same
constitutional mandate, the plaintiffs contended that the school district
185 Id. at 522.
i86 Coal. for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 68o So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla.
1996).
187 FLA. CONST. art. IX, § i.
188 Schroeder v. Palm Beach County Sch. Bd., No. 502oo8CA007579XXXXMB, 2008
WL 5376o86, at *i (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 28, 2oo8) aff'd, 1o So.3d 1134 (Fla. 2009).
189 Id.
i9o Class Action Complaint at 7, Schroeder, No. 5o2oo8CA0075 7 9XXXXMB, 2008 WL
5376086 (Fla. Cir. Ct. March 18, zoo8), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/racialjustice/
shroeder_v-palmbeachschoolboard complaint.pdf.
191 Seeid. at 6.




had not provided for this specific constitutional standard regarding African-
American, as well as Hispanic, children in the district as evidenced by a
"significant disparity between the graduation rates of African-American
and Hispanic students and those of white students."'194
The complaint continued by stating that this lack of graduation and
"the consequences for the students and the county are devastating as those
who leave school without even a high school diploma are significantly less
able or likely to share in the American dream."19 Interestingly, the complaint
does not define the "American dream," nor does it point to a specific portion
of the complaint where it is argued that the school district was statutorily
or constitutionally obligated to meet a standard equating to the "American
dream." This "American dream" concept was not defined, in terms of
how the court was to measure this standard in any operational manner;
thus, this term, as utilized by the plaintiffs, appears to be aspirational and
lacks statutory or constitutional definition within the State of Florida. The
plaintiffs argued that the school district was responsible, under the authority
of the Florida Constitution, for the "operation, control and supervision"
of the public schools of the county.' 96 The plaintiffs named the school
superintendent and members of the Board of Education in their official
capacity as defendants in the action. 97
In the complaint, the plaintiffs spent considerable time discussing
the various methodologies of computing high school graduation rates and
comparisons to selected school districts from across the nation.19s It seems
that one of the plaintiffs' legal theories was that if low graduation rates were
to exist and, in particular, a disparity among racial and ethnic groups, then
this would be a constitutional violation under the Florida Constitution.
Specifically the plaintiffs argued,
Even if the low graduation rates or high disparities between the graduation
rates of African-American and Hispanic students and white students can
be attributed to socio-economic status or immigrant status, the Palm
Beach County School District has a constitutional obligation to develop
and implement programs and measures that enable all of its students to
graduate, regardless of the students' race or ethnicity.
Regardless of the cause of the Palm Beach County School Districts' low
graduation rates an essential component of a uniform, efficient, safe, secure
and high quality education is a meaningful opportunity to graduate from
high school.
High school graduation rates as low as those in the Palm Beach County
194 Id.
195 Id. (emphasis added).
196 Id. at 4 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1001.32 (West zoo9)); see also FLA. CONST. art. IX, §
4.
197 Class Action Complaint, supra note 19 o , at 4-5.
198 See id. at 7-9.
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School District establish its failure to provide a uniform, efficient, safe,
secure and high quality education.
The complaint further detailed that "[in a 2003 study based on data
generated by the United States Department of Corrections, two-thirds
of state prison inmates in this Country are high school drop-outs and an
incredible 52% of all African-American male drop-outs in their early thirties
had a prison record."' ' ° It is unclear why the plaintiffs chose a six-year-
old national study or how the Palm Beach County Public School District
contributed to this fact and, if so, how the school district failed to meet a
constitutional threshold in this regard. The complaint next questioned the
Palm Beach County School District's methodology for treating GEDs the
same as regular high school diplomas.20' Again, it is unclear how this was
contrary to state statute or in conflict with the state constitutional mandate
in question.
Regarding the specifically-named plaintiffs, the complaint stated,
"The inadequate education provided by the defendants has had effects
on the named plaintiffs and, as a result, their chances of graduating from
high school are diminished."' 02 Once again, it is unclear what standard or
practice the plaintiffs allege that the school district must engage in regarding
the "chances" of students to graduate. Regarding the specifically-named
lead plaintiff, the complaint presented an interesting constitutional claim
described as follows:
Like many students in the Palm Beach County school district, plaintiff
Thomas Schroeder is having academic problems and is being subjected to
school discipline concerning attendance. Because Thomas is a student at
William T Dwyer High School in the Palm Beach County school district
and, because the district fails to graduate a very significant percentage of
its students every year, Thomas is not receiving a uniform, efficient, safe,
secure, and high quality education.203
Other named students at other schools within the district were also
included with this same exact wording.204 At this point it is interesting
to note that the lead plaintiff claims a constitutional failure by the school
district because he is having apparent difficulty attending school, yet the
record is silent as to what specific actions that the school district engaged
in, or did not engage in, that would have influenced his attendance rate.
199 Id. at 13.




204 See id. at 15-17.
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Plaintiffs sought relief asking for a declaratory judgment because "the
disparity in the high school graduation rates of African-American students
and those of white students in the Palm Beach County School District is a
violation of the [diefendants' constitutional obligation to provide a uniform
education to all students in Palm Beach County." 05  The complaint
further sought a declaratory judgment regarding graduation rate disparities
between Hispanic and white students and to have the school district adopt
a graduate rate definition to be approved by the court.3°6 Finally, plaintiffs
sought an "injunction and order mandating and requiring the [d]efendants
to improve the overall graduation rate ... and the graduate rate for each
racial subgroup of students, students who qualify for the school lunch
program, and English Language Learners" of the district. 07
On July 28, 2008, the court found that the issue was one of "whether a
private right of action exist[ed] for the enforcement of Article IX, section 1
of the Florida Constitution against an individual school [district]."2 08 The
court concluded, "as a matter of law, that no such private cause of action
exist[ed]. ' '2 09 In so holding the court noted that the plaintiffs argued that
the school district demonstrated a violation of the constitutional mandate
to "fulfill the 'fundamental value' of educating children with an education
that is 'uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality.' '210
The court relied on Simon v. Celebration Co. in which parents brought
suit against the Osceola County School Board arguing that the school
district "violated Article IX, section 1 of the Florida Constitution by failing
to provide [children] with a high quality free public education." '' The
court explained this reliance as follows:
We consider the holding in [Simon] to be that no private cause of action
exists for the enforcement of Article IX, section 1, against individual school
boards because the clause, in the words of the district court, specifically
states that the provision of an adequate education must be made by the
Legislature since the provision states that "adequate provision shall be
made by law." We consider the district court's observation that there is
no benchmark for determining what "adequate provision for education" is
meant to entail, nor is the term "high quality education" defined in the
provision, to be dicta."' 2
205 Id. at 18.
2o6 Id.
207 Id.
zo8 Schroeder v. Palm Beach County Sch. Bd., No. 5 o2oo8CAoo75 7 9XXIXXMB, zoo8
WL 5376086, at*i (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 28, 2oo8),aff'd, IO So.3d 1134 (Fla. 2009).
209 Id.
210 Id. (quoting FLA. CONsT. art. IX, § i).
211 Simon v. Celebration Co., 883 So. 2d 826, 829 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
212 Schroeder, 2oo8 WL 5376086, at *i (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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The court noted that the plaintiffs argued that the legislature's delegation
of its duty was clear to the individual school districts across the state.
1 3
Plaintiffs cited a statement made by the state Constitutional Revision
Commission's Commissioner Jon Mills during a full commission meeting
regarding the new constitutional changes as reflected in Article IX, section
1 in which he stated, "If the entire system, that is the school board had
a [thirty percent illiteracy] rate, that would be emblematic of an entire
system that was broken." ' 4 The court explained, regardless of issues that
might be raised as to the various reasonings and implications,
Substantively, however, this court still would find that the plain language
of Article IX, section 1 does not provides [sic] a private right of action for
the enforcement of that section against an individual school board or school
superintendent, but only against the state. Article IX, section 1 expressly
refers to education as being a "paramount duty of the state," and expressly
provides that adequate provision for education "shall be made by law."
While it is common sense that education also is a duty of individual school
boards and superintendents, the question here is the enforcement of an
express constitutional provision, which refers only to the state. Moreover,
only the state legislature can make law. 15
The court noted the plaintiffs' contention that a private right should
exist against school districts because the legislature had delegated the
responsibility to these agencies."' The court noted that this observation
might be logical, but that the language of the constitution controlled this
arena."1 7 Specifically the court stated,
Also unpersuasive is Plaintiffs' contention that this court should look
behind the plain language to divine the intent of the 1998 Constitutional
Revision Commission. While this court appreciates Plaintiffs' quote from
Commissioner Mills, no one person speaks for the body, and once the
Constitution becomes effective, the Commission's intent gives way to the
will of the people of the state. 18
In final summation the court noted,
While we stop short of saying 'never,' appellants have failed to
demonstrate in their allegations, or in their arguments on appeal, an
appropriate standard for determining 'adequacy' that would not present
213 Id.
214 Id. (citing FLA. CONSTITUTION REVIEW COMM'N, MEETING PROCEEDINGS FOR FEBRUARY
26, 1998, at 58 (1998), http://law.fsu.edu/crc/minutes/crcminutesoz2698.html).






a substantial risk of judicial intrusion into the powers and responsibilities
assigned to the legislature, both generally (in determining appropriations)
and specifically (in providing by law for an adequate and uniform system of
education)." 9
In 2009 the case was appealed and the decision was affirmed with
rehearing denied without comment.2 0 Thus, it appears challenging
an individual school district regarding an adequacy claim in the state of
Florida will not be successful. The lack of measuring and determining the
aspirational nature of the constitutional mandate will continue to prove
difficult to operationalize for the plaintiffs at least on an individual school
district level. Additionally, a high level of judicial intrusion would be
necessary if the first hurdle could be surmounted. As a result, these two
obstacles will continue to be problematic for the plaintiffs for at least the
near future within the state of Florida.
III. THE CONCEPT OF ADEQUACY
The issues before state courts have varied greatly since the days of
Rose v. Councilfor Better Education. Notwithstanding the variety of claims,
more suits are being filed based on adequacy or adequacy masquerading as
equity. Adequacy is a concept that has attractiveness for plaintiffs, yet it is
fraught with peril because of a variety of fundamental educational finance
research flaws. State legislatures are slowly but assuredly beginning to
grasp the conceptual and technical arguments against these elusive and
aspirational concepts that are presented to the courts.
A. Adequacy Challenges"2 '
The plaintiffs in adequacy cases argue the state aid distribution formula
is fiscally inadequate and as a result educationally inadequate."2 Thus, it
is argued, the state aid distributional formula fails the state constitutional
mandate and the applicable statutory mandates for an education that meets
minimal standards." 3 In certain instances, these plaintiffs are essentially
arguing that the state education finance formula, at best, demonstrates an
219 Id. at 4.
220 Schroeder v. Palm Beach County Sch. Bd., io So. 3d 1134, 1134 (Fla Dist. Ct. App.
20o9).
22! Much of what appears in this section is directly quoted from R.Craig Wood & Bruce
D. Baker, An Examination and Analysis of the Equity and Adequacy Concepts of Constitutional
Challenges to State Education Finance Distribution Formulas, 27 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV.
125, 142-43 (2004). Quotation marks and indications of alterations have been omitted for
purposes of clarity and readability.




"equality of poverty. '11 4 In other words, if a state aid distribution formula
allocates funds in an equitable manner, but such funds were, by definition,
unable to meet various educational and academic standards, such a
distribution formula would be by definition inadequate." 5 The question
then becomes whether the education finance distribution formula violates
the applicable constitutional and statutory obligations of the state.116 The
specific question is how the plaintiffs are able to satisfactorily demonstrate
in a valid manner how certain school districts are not able to reach certain
levels when other school districts, serving the same populations and
receiving the same moneys, are able to do so under the same education
finance distribution formula."7 The answer to this conundrum lies within
the research methodology, or lack thereof, in the plaintiffs' case.
Various legislatures have unwittingly established a standard by which
many plaintiff groups are able to question and attempt to quantitatively
establish noncompliance via the state distribution formula.2 8 That is to
say, in the movement toward greater educational accountability and raising
academic standards for the public schools of a given state, the legislature has,
unsuspectingly, defined by statute of what an adequate education consists.2 9
Thus, when school districts are not able to meet those stated standards,
due to fiscal constraints placed upon them by various constitutional tax
limitations, statutory and economic realities, the plaintiffs argue for relief.23
The relief sought is to declare the state education finance distributional
formula unconstitutional. 3t Often this is further compounded by the fact
that the state is already taxing at its maximum tax rate while observing a
constitutional limitation regarding operating within a state balanced budget.
Thus, the court is called into judging which constitutional standard must
be met by the legislature.
In recent years, state legislatures have faced an increasing number of
challenges to the state education finance distribution formula based on the
concept of adequacy. 3 Generally, the plaintiffs are not challenging the
equity of the distribution formula in the conventional sense. 33 That is, most
recent arguments have centered not on whether wealthy and poor school
districts have roughly the same amount of revenue per pupil, but whether,
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whether school districts with higher concentrations of high need students
have sufficient additional funding, beyond the basic level of funding, to
achieve the same standards.2 3 In many cases, plaintiffs link insufficient
overall funding or insufficient additional support primarily in poor urban
schools to insufficient student outcomes occurring disproportionately in
those same schools.235 The plaintiffs argue that, by virtue of the fact that
certain groups of children are underachieving on these state-imposed
sanctions, the distribution formula is, by definition, inadequate, at least
for these groups of children . 36 Yet, interestingly, the question remains the
same when achievement varies among school districts despite the fact that
per pupil expenditures may be remarkably similar within a given state.
This is evidenced by the prior discussion within this paper regarding the
most recent case in Florida.23
7
Also, increasingly, various groups ranging from state legislatures
themselves to a variety of advocacy groups have attempted to determine
the adequacy of public education. 3 8 An overview of these adequacy studies
reveals an increase of approximately thirty to fifty percent of expenditures
that would be necessary to meet an adequate level for public education. 39
Numerous studies have been conducted to date.
2 4°
B. The Measurement of Educational Adequacy141
It has long been established that state education finance distribution
formulas should be designed to accommodate differences in educational
need by allocating different levels of financial resources across schools




237 See supra pp. 764-69.
238 Wood & Baker, supra note 221, at 143.
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Assocs., RHODE ISLAND REPORT]; seealso R. C. WOOD & Assocs., FINANCING MISSOURI'S PUBLIC
ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY SCHOOLS: FINAL REPORT io6-31 (2OO5), http://www.rcwoodassoc.
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examples of weighted pupil calculations to adjust for grade level and school
size provided in textbooks dating back to at least 1951.243 At that time, the
primary emphasis was on the different costs of providing quality education
under different geographic circumstances.2" Education finance scholars
were evaluating the relative costs of providing curricular opportunities in
high schools of varied size. 45 Scholars and policymakers were beginning to
realize that there were sets of conditions that were outside of the control of
local school districts that affected the costs of operating schools.2
46
Since the Coleman report in 1966, much greater emphasis has been
placed on the influence of family backgrounds, on student outcomes, and
on the related costs of offsetting educational deficits associated with the
socio-economic status of the family. 47 Empirical research on costs, student
needs and educational outcomes have been reflected for many years in the
education finance literature.248
The goal of state finance aid distributional formulas is to provide students,
regardless of their individual backgrounds or their geographic circumstances,
with comparable programs to achieve educational opportunities. 49 Since
the emergence of the 1990s accountability movement and subsequent
passage of the federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), the emphasis of
many state school finance policies have been on outcomes and providing
equitable opportunity to achieve them. s0
Student need-driven state education finance distribution formulas are
rooted in the assumption that financial leverage can be applied to offset
deficits that some children have by virtue of birth circumstances.5 ' Further,
financial leverage can be used to create equitable conditions for learning,
and ultimately more equitable student opportunities in otherwise very
different environments, from the urban core to remote, sparse rural schools
hours from the nearest population center.52 Ultimately, the education
finance distribution formula must strive toward the right balance of student
and societal needs.2 5 3
243 Id. (citing PAUL R. MORT & WALTER C. REUSSER, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE: ITS
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Formulating educational adequacy is predominately determined by the
usage of one, or a combination of each of the four following approaches:
Evidenced Based Model; Professional Judgment Model; Production or
Cost Production Model; and Successful Schools Model.2 " The Evidenced
Based Model is essentially built on the approach of what educational
strategies and concepts appear to be the most successful in improving
achievement in the elementary and secondary schools. 5 The bulk of
these studies are virtually impossible to cost out and to determine if they
might be generalizable to a given state. 56 Nonetheless, the mainstream of
professional opinion supports certain programs, e.g., full-day kindergarten
and pilot programs, to be reasonable and cost effective mechanisms for
state legislatures to explore. 57 Evidence-based analysis requires a specific
empirical research basis for recommended resource configurations.5 8
Evidence-based models do not, however, require rigorous meta-analysis of
all available studies on each possible intervention.5 9 Nor does application
of evidence-based cost analysis require that the interventions in question
be evaluated with respect to specific, policy-relevant outcome measures."6
Thus, various studies purport to be evidenced based and yet use various
standards of what and how studies are chosen for this standard.2 6'
The Professional Judgment Model concept varies greatly from small,
non-scientific selected panels to more robust statewide surveys. Two
studies have actually surveyed every building principal with numerous
meetings to estimate the adequacy levels of various prototype schools. 62
In this manner different size schools and organizational variables may
be estimated. z63 One might assume, for example, that a panel of well-
informed professionals would prescribe inputs for schools based at least
partly on the professionals' knowledge of research literature on effective
reform strategies.2 64 However, in most instances this does not appear to be
the case.
6
The Production or Cost Production Model essentially creates a
254 See id. at 3.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 4.
257 Id.
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regression equation consisting of a host of variables to create a curve of
best fit.z66 Cost of education variables such as poverty, language proficiency,
and disabilities as well as competitive wages and issues of scale may be
addressed. 67 Increasingly common among recent analyses of educational
adequacy are statistical methods that may be used either to estimate
(a) the quantities and qualities of educational resources associated with
higher or improved educational outcomes or (b) the costs associated with
achieving a specific set of outcomes, in different school districts, serving
different student populations. 68 The first of these methods is known as
the Education Production function and the second of these methods is
known as the Education Cost function.2 69
The Successful Schools Model is essentially the process of performance
measures reflective of successful schools/districts by a state's criteria while
accounting for student needs and demographics.2 0 The most notable
variable is the number of students who live in poverty. The model
determines a targeted expenditure equal to what successful schools/districts
are achieving in a state."' Successful Schools studies utilize outcome data
on measures such as attendance and dropout rates and student test scores
to identify that set of schools or school districts in a state that meet a chosen
standard of success.27 2
Utilizing the exact same data from a given state, the four models will
produce a wide array of adequacy targets. The models will yield targets
from the highest to the lowest with the Professional Judgment Model
generally being the highest and the Evidenced Based Model being the
lowest cost; the Education Costs or Production Function Model and the
Successful Schools Model will be between these two. Unfortunately, a
major shortcoming of either Professional Judgment or Evidenced Based
is that these studies appear to be poor estimators of the actual costs of
educating children. 73 Professional Judgment models suffer from significant
reliability and validity issues while Evidenced Based models often draw
assumptions based on studies with very limited or no generalizability 7 4
C. Adequacy Studies as Advocacy
The literature concerning state adequacy studies is growing over time
z66 Id. at 3.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 15.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 3.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 14.




as education finance researchers continue to examine and refine education
finance studies. However, the actual examination of these documents is
scarce and objective analysis is almost unheard of within the literature. In
some instances, the actual studies are unattainable. Nearly all commentators
have either a self-interest or a social/political perspective that prevents
objective analysis regarding the public policy issues under examination.
Of the studies done to date, many are, in fact, reflective of advocacy groups
or state political organizations. Thus, by definition one has to examine
the validity of the claims therein. Additionally, many are based solely on
small, non-scientific selected professional judgment panels. Professional
judgment panels, with rare exceptions, will always produce the highest cost
estimates as compared to the other three models.
Lori R. Benton, in one of the few studies that has examined state
adequacy studies in detail, categorized them in a most useful manner."' 5
Approximately one-half of the state education finance adequacy studies
to date have been conducted, or sponsored, by some type of advocacy
organization."' Appendix A reflects an overview, presented in chronological
order, of the major state adeqaucy studies to date.
CONCLUSION
The adequacy claims as presented in the various state courts all attempt
to totally ignore the issues of equity and to concentrate on issues of perceived
adequacy. Adequacy is defined according to how the plaintiffs perceive it
from state to state. It is critical to understand a fundamental flaw in the
adequacy concept. This flaw is found within the education finance equity
literature. That is, in fact, if equity were judged to have been met, then,
by definition, all school districts would either be adequate or inadequate.
If it were determined that fiscal equity existed by the traditional measures
utilized in such studies, then the plaintiffs' burden changes significantly in
terms of explaining why the plaintiffs' districts are offering an inadequate
education. For example, if expenditures were remarkably the same, that
is, within a narrow range and exhibiting a high level of horizontal equity as
reflected in the Variance, the McLoone Index, the Coefficient of Variation,
and the Gini Coefficient,2 77 plaintiffs' explanations must be drawn toward
issues of student achievement.
If student achievement becomes the primary basis upon which
275 Lori Rosen Benton, Examination and Application of the Education Adequacy
Models and Studies to the State of Florida 175-82 (Dec. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, University of Florida) (on file with author).
276 See id. (showing that out of fifty-one studies, twenty-five were sponsored by some
form of adequacy organization).
277 ROBERT BERNE & LEANNA STIEFEL, 'TIE MEASUREMENT OF EQUITY IN SCHOOL FINANCE:
CONCEPTUAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND EMPIRICAL DIMENSIONS 19 (1984).
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adequacy claims are made, it initiates a conundrum for the courts. It is
a conundrum when this contention is examined and analyzed. If equity
were statistically present, and assuming that a given set of state standards
have even a modest degree of discrimination, then the result will always be
that some students will not meet the prescribed state standards. Given the
undeniable fact that a bell curve of student abilities exists, and assuming
that the state standard actually measures some degree of achievement,
then by definition some students will fail. On the other hand, assuming
that the state standards are at best minimalist, then the vast majority of
students may meet the state standard with a high passage rate regardless of
the existence of the bell curve of individual abilities. The concept of one-
hundred percent passage based on NCLB standards or a state standard is,
at best, questionable and, in actuality, not possible if state standards were
indeed meaningful. If an extremely high passage rate were exhibited then
the achievement variable would be diminished to the point of not being a
fruitful path for the plaintiffs.
That is, often the examination reveals a setting in which statistically
similar school districts serving statistically similar students produce
significantly differing results within a state that exhibits a high degree of
statistical education finance equity. In other words, some school districts
pass the state standards, while other school districts do not, yet they have
similar access to revenues and have similar expenditures.
Given these realities and the highly political nature of adequacy claims
several state courts reflect a manipulation of precedent and text in order to
fit a desired result, despite the tensions marked in these opinions. It may be
ventured that an interpretive framework is at play that, although decidedly
consequentialist, is rooted in the philosophical foundations articulated in
John Hart Ely's "representative-reinforcing" concept of judicial review.278
As noted, Ely constructed a rationale premised on the responsibility of the
judiciary to insist that the legislature provide citizens the rights essential
to the operation of a democratic political process.27 9 To Ely, "unblocking
stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial review ought
preeminently to be about."2 80 In a similar tack, Ronald Dworkin argued
that "[tihe function of judges... [was] to secure the 'democratic conditions'
necessary for a democracy to exist."28 1 Key to this appreciation of judicial
278 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dismusr. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 153-61
(I98O); see, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 8oi N.E.2d 326, 345 (N.Y. 2003); Hoke
County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 394-95 (N.C. 2004); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d
384,386 (Vt. 1997); seealso Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388,407 (Wis. 2000) (although find-
ing for the state, the court expanded the constitutional text of the education article to embrace
an adequacy standard that included preparation for students roles as citizens).
279 See ELY, supra note 278, at 117.
280 Id.
281 Edward B. Foley, Rodriquez Revisited: Constitutional Theory and School Finance, 32 GA.
L. REV. 475, 503 (1998) (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF
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review, evidenced in the recent case record, is the right of all citizens in a
democracy to be informed participants; thus, imposing upon the state the
responsibility to ensure that they are provided the opportunity to achieve
what Robert Dahl characterized as "enlightened understanding."' ' 82  This
aggressive affirmation of the nexus between education and the fundamental
rights of citizenry, dismissed in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez in a judicial treatment utilized subsequently in courts presenting
it as restrained,"" has become a principle characteristic of an activist state
judiciary in the realm of public education finance.
Ignored is the operative presumption that the ordinary democratic
political process cannot be entrusted to protect the rights in question;
therefore, the risk posed by an unresponsive and/or irresponsive legislative
branch is balanced by the inherent risks posed by greater judicial
involvement." 4 An integral component of Ely's concept is the assertion
that the protection of the political process interests of those who cannot do
so for themselves is the responsibility of the judiciary, a duty superseding
separation of powers doctrine and a position affirmed by the Supreme Court
in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15.2 11 In Nixon v. United States,
Justice Souter noted in a concurring opinion in referenec to the political
question case that "[n]ot all interference is inappropriate or disrespectful
... and application of the doctrine ultimately turns, as Learned Hand put
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 32-33 (I996)).
282 Id. at 504 (quoting ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 112 (1989)).
283 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1972). Plaintiffs had
contended that education was unique due to its relationship to other rights and liberties ac-
corded protection under the Constitution such as speech and the right to vote. In addressing
this presumed nexus, the Court marked that it had "long afforded zealous protection against
unjustifiable governmental interference with the individual's rights to speak and to vote. Yet,
we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citi-
zenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice." Id.
284 See Foley, supra note 281, at 105-09.
285 ELY, supra note 278, at 117-20 (noting Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395
U.S. 62 1, 627-28 (1969)). The Court, in invalidating a requirement that a person own property
in order to vote in school board elections, stated:
[Tihe deference usually given to the judgment of legislators does not
extend to decisions concerning which resident citizens may participate
in the election of legislators or other public officials.... The presump-
tion of constitutionality and the approval given "rational" classifications
in other types of enactments are based on an assumption that the insti-
tutions of state government are structured so as to represent fairly all
the people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in effect a
challenge of this basic assumption, the assumption can no longer serve
as the basis for presuming constitutionality.
Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627-28.
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it, 'on how importunately the occasion demands an answer."' 2 86
The difficulty with these views is obvious-the answers are often
preordained based on the political-social--economic filter of the court.
That is, it is only an answer if the court ordains what the answer should
be absent the constraints of the state constitution and the privilege of the
people as represented in the state legislature.
The courts exhibiting restraint have, in contrast, reflected Chief Justice
Burger's dissent in Plylerv. Doe that "it is for Congress, and not this Court,
to assess the 'social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are
denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social
order rests. ' '2 87
The dilemma for the various state courts is overwhelming upon any
examination. It is perhaps one thing to assert the role of the court into
a political-social-economic discussion absent specific constitutional
language. It is entirely another to make such public policy premised on the
concept of "unblocking stoppages within the democratic process" based
on studies that do not meet the most minimal requirements of scientific
inquiry-studies that are interwoven with advocacy while lacking scientific
justification . 8  Thus, at least in some instances, absent what we know to
exist in society, advocacy groups will construct what they wish to exist in
society and continue to hope the courts will enforce their definition of the
"American dream" absent a constitutional standard to do so.
286 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
287 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 253-54 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citation omit-
ted).
288 ELY, supra note 278, at 117.
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Appendix A: Major State Education Adequacy Studies
State Title of Study Year Researcher Funding Source Advocacy
Group
(Yes/No)
Massachusetts Every Child a July 1991 Massachusetts Massachusetts Yes
Winner Business Business





Wyoming A Proposed May 1997 Management Joint No
Cost-Based Analysis & Appropriations
Block Grant Planning Comm. of
Model for Associates the Wyoming
Wyoming (MAP) Legislature
School Finance









Oregon The Oregon April 1999 Legislative Oregon No
Quality Council on Legislative




Oregon Oregon Quality Jan. 2000 Oregon Oregon Gov. No
Education Quality John Kitzhaber





Illinois A Procedure June 2001 Augenblick Illinois No
for Calculating and Myers, Education
a Base Cost Inc. Funding







Maryland A Professional June 2001 Management The New Yes
Judgment Analysis & Maryland






Maryland Calculation Sept. 2001 Augenblick Maryland No
of the Cost of and Myers Commission
an Adequate on Education
Education Finance, Equity,






Wyoming Proposed Jan. 2002 Management Wyoming State No




New York Estimating Feb. 2002 Duncombe Center for Yes




Kansas Calculation May 2002 Augenblick Kansas' No
of the Cost and Myers Legislative
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Montana Calculation Aug. 2002 Myers and Montana Yes
of the Cost Silverstein School Board








Indiana Calculation Sept. 2002 Augenblick Indiana State Yes
of the Cost of and Myers, Teachers








Colorado Calculation Jan. 2003 Augenblick Colorado School Yes









Kentucky A State-of-the- Feb. 2003 Picus and Kentucky No




Kentucky Calculation Feb. 2003 Verstegen Council Yes
of the Cost of for Better








Washington What Will It Mar. 2003 Conley and The Rainer Yes




a New Vision of
Adequacy for
School Funding
Kentucky A Professional May 2003 Picus and Kentucky No




North Dakota Calculation July 2003 Augenblick, North Dakota No
of the Cost of Palaich, and Department








Arkansas An Evidenced- Sept. 2003 Picus Arkansas No
Based Legislature's
Approach to Joint
School Finance Committee on
Adequacy in Educational
Arkansas Adequacy
Tennessee Calculation Dec. 2003 Augenblick, Coalition for Yes
of the Cost of Palaich, and Tennessee's










New York Estimating the Jan. 2004 New York New York No
Additional Cost State State Board of




WOOD - APPENDIX A
Minnesota Determining Feb. 2004 Haveman Minnesota Yes
the Cost of Center for







New York Resource Mar. 2004 Standard & New York State No
Adequacy Poor's (S & P) Commission
Study for the on Education




New York The New York Mar. 2004 American The Atlantic Yes
Adequacy Institutes Philanthropies,
Study: for Research Bill and
Determining (AIR), MAP Melinda Gates
the Cost of and Taylor Foundation,





Texas School Mar. 2004 Gronberg, The Texas No
Outcomes Jansen, Taylor, Joint Select
and School and Booker Committee for
Costs: The Public School
Cost Function Finance
Approach
Texas Estimating May 2004 Imazeki and Plaintiffs in Yes
the Costs Reschovsky West Orange





Arizona An Evidenced- June 2004 Picus Rodel Yes
Based Charitable
Approach to Foundation of
School Finance Arizona and




Arizona Arizona English Feb. 2005 National Arizona No
Language Conference Legislative






Hawaii State of Hawaii Mar. 2005 Thornton Hawaii No
Adequacy Department of
Funding Study Education
Connecticut Estimating June 2005 Augenblick. Connecticut Yes
the Cost of Palaich, and Coalition for




Montana Determining Oct. 2005 R.C. Wood and Quality Schools No
the Cost of Associates Interim
Providing an Committee
Adequate and the
Education in Montana State
the State of Legislature
Montana







Kansas Estimating Dec. 2005 Duncombe Kansas No
the Costs and Yinger Legislative







Kansas Elementary Jan. 2006 Legislative Legislative No
and Secondary Division of Division of Post
Education Post Audit Audit (LPA)
in Kansas: (LPA)
Estimating the
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South Dakota Estimating Jan. 2006 Augenblick, South Dakota Yes
the Cost of Palaich, & Alliance for
an Adequate Associates Education
Education in
South Dakota
Arkansas Recalibrating Aug. 2006 Odden, Picus, Adequacy No
the Arkansas and Goetz Study Oversight
School Funding Sub-Committee







Nevada Estimating Aug. 2006 Augenblick, Nevada No
the Cost of Palaich, and Legislative
an Adequate Associates, Inc. Committee to
Education in Study School
Nevada Financing
Adequacy
Washingcon An Evidence- Sept. 2006 Odden, K-12 Advisory Yes
Based Picus, Goetz, Committee of
Approach to Mangan, and Washington
School Finance Fermanich Learns
Adequacy in
Washington
Washington Washington Sept. 2006 Fermanich, Washington Yes
Learns: Mangan, Learns
Successful Odden, Picus,
District Study Gross, and
Rudo
Colorado Estimating Oct. 2006 Augenblick, Colorado School Yes








Minnesota Estimating Nov. 2006 Silverstein, P.S. Minnesota Yes




Montana Estimating Jan. 2007 Silverstein, Montana Yes
the Cost of Rose, Palaich, Quality
an Adequate Myers, and Education




Washington Washington Jan. 2007 Conley and Washington Yes
Adequacy Rooney Education









California Aligning School Mar. 2007 Sonstelie, Institute for No
Finance with Altman, Research on
Academic Battersby, Education
Standards: Benelli, Dhaey, Policy and
A Weighted Gardinali, Hill, Practice at
Student and Lipscomb Stanford
Formula Based University
on a Survey of
Practitioners
California Efficiency Mar. 2007 Chambers, Bill and Yes
and Adequacy Levin, and Melinda Gates
in California DeLancey Foundation,
School Finance: (American William and
A Professional Institutes Flora Hewlett
Judgment for Research Foundation,




Rhode Island State of Mar. 2007 R.C. Wood and Joint No







Wisconsin Moving From Mar. 2007 Odden, Picus, Wisconsin Yes
Good to Great Archibald, School Finance
in Wisconsin: Goetz, Adequacy
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Pennsylvania Costing Out Nov. 2007 Augenblick, Pennsylvania No
the Resources Palaich, and State Board of






New Mexico An Jan. 2008 American Funding No
Independent Institutes Formula Task
Comprehensive for Research Force appointed
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